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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW.

WOOD.

By HENRY
Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers, 1894.

It is not the function of a law magazine to review economic
literature. Natural law is not a subject with which the lawyer
deals, and yet, since we have taken the trouble to read this
book, and since we know several members of the bar who are
more or less interested in economic subjects, we desire to say
that it is the worst of a very bad lot that shall be nameless.
The writer seems to be imbued with one idea, and one idea
only, and that is, that naturallaw must never be interfered with
under any circumstances and conditions. Individual lines of
action "are often inharmonious and contrary, while the operations of natural law are consistent and harmonious." What
this natural law is about which Mr. WOOD talked so fluently
we do not know, and we have a suspicion the author does not
know, either. For instance, what does he mean by this: "Its
different factors may modify or counteract, but never oppose
each other, for truth cannot be in opposition to truth. Its
only warfare is with error, and its complete victory is simply a
question of time." Or, again, what is meant by, "Natural law,
being normal, is truthful ;" or, of the natural law in the economic realm "as one of the many subdivisions of the universal
natural law or the grand unity of truth." Shade of Sir Henry
Maine! Would that that author, when he wrote the history of
the ideas which, during the different stages of the world's
development, have gathered around the idea of the word
"natural," could have seen this curious conglamoration and
mixture of ideas, which, revolving in the mind of 'Mr. WOOD,
came to light in these pages.
We speak thus harshly of this work, which we would otherwise ignor, for the following reasons: The science of political
economy or economics is a noble science-as noble, perhaps,
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as the science of law, and certainly requiring just as deep
research, just as efficient study, and just as clear a mind.
Suppose that, to-day, there should be written a work on the
law 6f contracts, which, disregarding all the decisions of the
court, all that had ever been written or said, produced a work
that one who had never studied law would write, would it not
then be the duty of every man who cared for the science of law
to condemn that book? The book and the writer would be
masquerading under a title which they had no right to. Now,
this sort of -thing is what we believe only happens too frequently in political economy or economics. Men entirely
unfamiliar with the literature of the subject, or who have
never taken the trouble to examine the facts of'the actual
world, write out their own ideas, or what they are pleased to
call ideas, gathered with little trouble and less thought, and
label the whole "Political Economy" or." Economics," or
some title by which the innocent reader will be deluded into
This we
thinking that the author is a student of the subject.
do not consider as fair. It would not be fair in law, and it
is not fair in economics. It is not' fair to the men who are
spending their lives trying to make the economic and social
laws plain. Such a book as this tends to throw ridicule around
the valuable labors'of others. Publishers like the ones whose
names are on this work should regret that it is there.
W. D. L.
CASES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JAMrES BRADLEY THAYER.

at Harvard University.
1894.

Part I. With Notes by
LL.D., Weld Professor of Law
Cambridge: -Charles W. Sever,
LAW.

This work is the first part of a collection of cases on Constitutional Law which have been looked forward to for some
time by those of the'profession interested in that subject. The
high position of the writer gave promise of a valuable work;
and t he result, so far, more than comes up to our expedtations.
Case books from the Harvard Law School have become
so familiar to members of the profession, that it is almost

.
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unnecessary to describe their character. The present collection opens with some preliminary quotations on government
taken from Aristotle, Montesqusui, Holland, Blackstone, etc.
The principal English decisions on prerogative of the crown
are given; but the most interesting cases in the volume are
those which illustrate the rise of that peculiar "American doc"trine" of Constitutional Law, the power of the judiciary to
declare an Act of the Legislature contrary to the Constitution
void. The cases of Rutgers v. Waddington and Trevett v.
Weeden will. always have a lasting interest for the student of
this subject. The first of these is reprinted from a pamphlet
of Mr. Henry B. Dawson, published in i866. The court did
not really assert, though they implied, that they had the power
to set aside a statute as being contrary to the Constitution.
New York had passed an act which, in terms, would have permitted one, who, during the Revolutionary War, had had his
premises occupied by foreign troops, to bring a suit in trespass
against such person. The court thought that to apply the
statute so as to cover such a case, after the treaty of peace
between the United States and Great Britain, was to imply
that the Legislature of the State of New York desired to set
aside the law of nations, an implication which the court refused
to make. "Whoever, then," they say, "is clearly exempted
from the operation of this statute by the law of nations, this
court must take it for granted, could never have been intended
to be c,-.mprehended within it by the Legislature . . ."

This

very moderate decision seems to have aroused public feeling
to such an extent that a mass meeting was held, which issued
an address, parts of which read strangely to us after a hundred
years -,fexperience of State Legislatures, on the one hand,
tramp':ng on the rights of individuals, and courts of justice
-onthe other, standing between the individual and the arbitrary
action of the State. The quotation from the address runs as
follows:
"From what has been said, we think that no one can doubt
the meaning of the law. It remains to inquire whether a court
of judicature can consistently, with our Constitution and laws,
adjudge contrary to the plan and obvious meaning of a statute.
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That the mayors' courts have done so in this case is manifest
from the foregoing remarks. That there should be a power
vested in courts of judicature, whereby they might control the.
supreme legislative power, we think is absurd in itself. Suckt
pazoer in courts would be destructive of liberty and remove all
security of propero. The design of courts of justice in our
government, from the very nature of their institution, is to
declare laws, not to alter them. WVhenever they depart from
this design of their institution, they confound legislative and
judicial powers. The laws govern where a government is free,
and every citizen knows what remedy the law gives him for
every injury. But this cannot be the case where courts, if theydeem a law unreasonable, may set it aside. Here, however
plainly the law may be in his favor, he cannot be certain of
redress until he has the opinion of the court." At the same
time, the House of Assembly resolved, "That the judgment
aforesaid is, in its tendency, subversive of all law and good
order, and leads directly to anarchy and confusion; because, if
a court instituted for the benefit and government of a corporation may take upon them to dispense with and act in direct
violation of a plain and known law of the State, all other courts,
either superior or inferior, may do the like; and therewith will
end all our dear b6ught rights and privileges, and legislatures
become useless."
In the report of Trevett v. Weeden, we regret that the
argument of Mr. Varum was omitted. Mr. Varum's speech
would have added a great deal to the value of the report
of the case, as it places in extenso the reasons on which
the judges probably reached their decision. There is no
opinion of the court, but Prof. THAYER has printed the reply'
of the judges to the General Assembly when they were
summoned before them to explain why they had declared
an act of the Assembly void.
In this part oil the work Prof. THAYER has used freely
the material collected by the. late BRINTON CoxE, ESQ., of
Philadelphia, and printed in his posthumous work on" "Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation," which we had
such pleasure in reviewing at length on page 76 of the current
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of the most interesting parts of Mr. CoXE's work are thus
preserved with full permission of Mr. CoxE's editor, WILLIAIVI
M. MEIGS, ESQ., in a place where they will be apt to reach a

larger class of readers. There are few more interesting things
in the whole work, than the report of the case which came
before the Hanseatic Court of Upper Appeal at Lubeck, in
which that court decided that even when constitutional provisions do not exist, prohibiting an official attesting, the legal
validity of ordinances of the sovereign, which have not been
authenticated in due form, the judge has, according to general
legal principles, both the authority and the duty of refusing to
apply an ordinance of the sovereign which, while its provisions
are those of a law, has not been enacted according to theforms
prescribed fof making law by the Constitution of the land.
This decision has since been overruled, but it is interesting as
the only modern example of a civil lav court attempting to
hold the government to the provisions of a written Constitution. On page 149 to 154 inclusive and in other parts of
the work the author has reprinted the major portions of his
article in the Harvard Law Review on the "Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law."
The report of the- case of Fletcher v. Peck, as an illustration of the power of the courts to set aside unconstitutional
legislation, leads us to mention one apparent difficulty in this
system of reporting cases illustrative of the different branches
of a subject. Fletcher v. Peck, while it is an excellent illustration of how the courts of the United States can declare an
act of the State contrary to the Federal Constitution void, has
its chief importance not in that fact, but in the fact that it is a
case where the Supreme Court first declared that a grant of
land was a contract which the State could not impair. The
decision in this last respect was fraught with consequences
which are still being worked out. It is a matter of speculation, for instance, whether the Dartmouth College Case would
have been placed upon the ground that the Act altering the
charter violated a contract, and not on the ground that it confiscated property, had the opinion in Fletcher v. Peck never
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been written. And it is an interesting query whether had thecourt considered the Act of New Hamphire in that case nothing more than the confiscation of property, whether they would
have affirmed the decision of the State Court. or held that an
exzpost facto law could apply to a civil as well as to a criminal
case. However this may be, it will be inieresting to see what
TProf..Thayer will do when he comes to publish cases illustrative
of that clause in the Cbnstitution which prohibits a State from
passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Well, he
will omit Fletcher v. Peck?
In a subject like Constitutional Law the same case may
be of great importance, not only in one, but in two or more
branches of the subject. Space prohibits that the cases.
should be republished in every connection. References to a
case which was important in one connection, which had been
reported in another, might be valuable, but the report of the
case having been written from the standpoint that the case is
to illustrate the development of a particular principle of law, the
report naturally brings out the parts of the case and the parts.
of the opinion dealing with that principle, and, therefore, thereport may not be suited as an illustration of the development
of other principles. Prof. Thayer has prepared himself for
getting around this difficulty by printing the opinion of thecourt in such cases as Fletcher v. Peck, in full. Why, however, he omitted the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, in that
case, we do not know. Will not that opinion be important
when he comes to discuss the meaning of expostfacto laws,
or whether a law can be declared void because against the
spirit of the Constitution? In fact, we note that all the cases
on the subject of the power of the court to set aside acts for their unconstitutionalty seems to omit those opinions, like Mr.,
Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck, which would set aside the
Act of the Legislature, not because it was contraiy to any express clause in the -,ritten Constitution, but because it was not
to be presumed that the Legislature had been granted power to
pass such Acts. For instance, the case of Trustee of the University v; Foy, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Chase in Calder
v. Bull has been entirely omitted. It is true that the ideas rep-.
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resented in these cases, and in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Johnson did not at the time develop into principles of Constitutional Law, but to-day such members of the Supreme Court
as Mr. Justice Brewer are reverting to the ideas of Chase and
Johnson and Mr. Haywood, counsel, in the case of the
Trustees of the University v. Foy above mentioned, and basing
their opinions on Constitutional matters on lines of reasoning
suggested by these old cases and opinions. (See AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER AND REVIEV, Vol. 32, 971).
Even peculiar doctrines of constitutional law, though never
again taken up by the members of the profession and of
the present Supreme Court, are sometimes interesting and
instructive.
We presume, however, that to insert all the
ideas on Constitutional Law, as well as those which come
to naught, as those which developed and became imbedded
as part of the fundamental principles of the subject, wduld
have unduly increased the size of the work.
The volume before us is the first instalment of what is
evidently a work of permanent value, to which will turn
all students of Constitutional Law, as well those students of
twenty-five years hence, as those of to-day. If the remaining
parts of this work attain, as they doubtless will, the high standard of the first part, the profession will owe another debt of
gratitude to the University in Massachusetts.
W. D. L.

A

By TIIEOPHILUS
PARSONS, LL.D.
Fourth Edition. Revised and Enlarged
JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, Jr. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

1893.

It has been fifteen years since the third edition of Professor
PARSON'S work made its appearance.
It is to Mr. BEALE
(Assistant Professor .of Law at Harvard) that we owe the
present revision and enlargement of the " Partnership." The
Editor has done his work well. In the first place, he has
added a chapter upon a subject which has seen much develop-
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ment and undergone important changes since the previous
publication of the work-that of business combinations and
"trusts." The question is treated very clearly, though briefly,
finding a place in the work from its relation to partnership law
rather than for the purpose of discussing its depths, interesting
and important though they undoubtedly are. This chapter
first* describes a few of the present more important "trusts,"
and shows the objects'of their custom and their nature legally
considered. The question of illegality is then taken up, and, as
regards the cases to which corporations are parties, a distinction drawn between the violation of, or departure from, charter
rights, and the more interesting and less well-defined ground of
"public policy." A list of the various State "anti-trust" acts is
added in a note and a brief mention of the extent to which they
have gone.
The editor remarks in his preface that "much of the discussion in the first and fifth chapters" (of thie previous edition)
"was rendered unnecessary by Cox v. Hickman." The mercantile conception has, he says, become the legal conception as
well. On page 41, chap. 5, the partnership character is discussed.
Mr. Beale has not hesitated to make liberal use of his office
as regards the treatment of the notes. We find, however, that
the changes are improvements, and such is surely the province
of the editor.
A useful appendix of forms for partnership agreements (and
disagreements) is added. The book has throughout been
divided into sections, following the present almost universal
custom. Text books are usually consulted, not read continuously, and some sort of heading to'the-various subjectsW. S. E.
are necessary.

The liditors announce that the following erratum has been brought
to their attention: Page 69, 2d column, 4th line of the January number,
1894 (Vol. I, N. S., No. x), after the words "upon the discretion of a last
trustee," insert "or being given in'perpetuity."

